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Abstract 
 
We analyze the stability of domestic financial linkages between periods of calm and 
turbulent market conditions. Our model develops a simultaneous test of shift 
contagion and bi-directional pure contagion, which is applied to the equity and 
currency markets of a group of East Asian emerging economies. Our results show a 
great deal of instability in these markets with widespread evidence of pure contagion 
in both directions. There is less evidence of shift contagion with the transmission of 
common shocks unchanged between regimes for the majority of countries. 
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1. Introduction 
 The financial system has been rocked by a number of severe turbulent periods 
over the past two decades. In particular, emerging financial markets have been 
severely affected. These tumultuous episodes have been characterized by large 
negative asset returns and high volatility and their repercussions have caused 
problems for the investment community and policymakers alike. Furthermore, these 
shocks appear to have spread across both national borders and different asset classes. 
When the spread of shocks occurs in a manner that could not have been anticipated 
from existing pre-crisis linkages, this is often labeled as ‘contagion’.  
Ever since the 1987 stock market crash in the US, a voluminous literature has 
developed on the identification and causes of financial market contagion. The 
majority of studies have tended to concentrate on a single event and study the 
transmission of shocks from the source market to the same asset class in other 
international markets. For example, studies such as Forbes and Rigobon (2002), 
Caporale, Cipollini and Spagnolo (2005), Chiang, Jeon and Li (2007) and Flavin and 
Panopoulou (2007, 2008) have focused on equity markets; while bond markets are 
analyzed in Favero and Giavazzi (2002) and Dungey, Fry, Gonzalez-Hermosillo and 
Martin (henceforth DFGM) (2006); with currency markets receiving the attention of 
Cerra and Saxena (2002) and Dungey, Fry and Martin (2004). More recently, a 
number of studies have sought to examine channels of contagion between different 
asset classes across geographical borders. Hartmann, Straetmans and de Vries (2004) 
focus on the stock and bond markets of the G5 countries, while Dungey and Martin. 
(2007) and DFGM (2008) analyze East Asian and Latin American markets 
respectively. Ito and Hashimoto (2005) investigate the interactions between currency 
and equity markets in East Asian markets. 
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However, less attention has been afforded to contagious effects between 
different asset types within the same country. This is an important question as 
policymakers seek to understand the source and evolution of adverse shocks. 
Likewise, portfolio managers who are exposed to foreign asset risk will want to be 
familiar with the stability of asset linkages during varying market conditions. If asset 
returns exhibit increased comovement during a crisis, then this will compound losses 
on a country-specific portfolio, whereas markets moving in the opposite direction 
would provide a hedge against losses in one market. We focus on identifying channels 
of contagion between currency and equity markets in East Asian markets during 
periods of high-volatility. In particular, we test for both shift and pure contagion 
within a unified framework. Shift contagion is defined as a change in the normal 
relationship between pairs of markets during a crisis. Normal levels of market 
interdependence are often attributed to linkages such as financial flows or exposure to 
common shocks. Shift contagion implies that the diffusion of common shocks 
changes between low- and high-volatility regimes; thereby causing the ‘normal’ 
relationship between market pairs to become unstable during episodes of financial 
turmoil. On the other hand, pure contagion is suffered during a crisis period when a 
shock that is normally idiosyncratic spills over to another market (becoming an 
additional common factor). The transmission of these idiosyncratic shocks occurs 
through channels that are not identifiable during normal market conditions.1 The main 
innovation of this paper is that we build an empirical model that allows us to 
simultaneously capture shift and bi-directional pure contagion.2 Accounting for these 
bi-directional effects is very important as it allows us to fully assess the extent and 
                                                 
1 There is great debate in the literature on the definition of contagion and for an overview the reader is 
referred to Pericoli and Sbracia (2003). 
2 Dungey, Milunovich and Throp (2008) capture bi-directional pure contagious effects between Asian 
equity markets after controlling for common external shocks. 
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impact of market interactions. The correct identification of the type of contagion 
operating between markets and the stability of market linkages is vital to prescribe 
appropriate policy. 
There is strong theoretical and empirical evidence to suggest that equity and 
foreign exchange markets are interlinked. Pavlova and Rigobon (2007) develop a 
theoretical model of stock, bond and exchange rate co-movements, where the sign of 
the correlation between stock prices and the exchange rate depends upon the relative 
importance of supply and demand shocks in the economy. Pan, Fok and Liu (2007) 
find significant evidence of causal relationships between stock and currency markets, 
though the direction of causality differs across the sampled countries. Likewise, 
Granger, Huang and Yang (2000) provide evidence of feedback effects between many 
East Asian stock and FX markets. While, these studies provide evidence of dynamic 
linkages between markets, our focus is on the transmission of contemporaneous 
shocks between market pairs.  
Our results show strong evidence of bi-directional pure contagion between 
equity and currency markets. In particular, shocks that are normally specific to the 
foreign exchange market tend to be transmitted to the equity market for all countries. 
Similarly, high-volatility equity-specific shocks generate contagious effects in the 
currency market of all countries except Taiwan. On the other hand, there is less 
evidence of shift contagion. Only Korea and the Philippines exhibit any statistical 
evidence of instability in the transmission of common shocks between calm and 
turbulent market conditions. An analysis of the conditional variance shows that 
common shocks play a greater role in equity markets than in currency markets. Pure 
contagion is present in all markets but its overall contribution to risk varies across 
countries.  
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our empirical model.  
Section 3 describes the data and discusses the filters applied to the asset returns. 
Section 4 reports our empirical findings for the contagion tests, while our concluding 
remarks are contained in section 5. 
  
2. Empirical model and econometric methodology 
We extend the methodology of Gravelle, Kichian and Morley (2006) and 
Flavin and Panopoulou (2008) to test for both shift and bi-directional pure contagion 
within a unified framework. Gravelle, Kichian and Morley (2006) develop a test for 
shift contagion. Flavin and Panopoulou (2008) extend the model to capture the 
potential effects of pure contagion. The key enhancement of our model is that we 
allow for bi-directional pure contagion. In many studies of contagion, it is possible to 
identify one particular market as the source of the shock and then test for pure 
contagious effects from this to other markets e.g. in studies of East Asian equity 
markets, Hong Kong is often identified as the source (see Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; 
Chiang, Jeon and Li 2007; Flavin and Panopoulou, (2008); amongst others). 
However, there is little theoretical or consistent empirical evidence to guide us as to 
the direction of contagion between stock and foreign exchange markets. Therefore it 
is ultimately an empirical question.  
This framework is ideally suited to capturing the different channels of 
contagion and represents a move away from the more traditional correlation-based 
tests that have been criticized in the literature (e.g. see Billio and Pelizzon, 2003; 
Pesaran and Pick, 2007). The model is bivariate in nature and belongs to the family of 
factor models widely used in financial economics. The factor model is attractive in 
that we avoid the debate as to what the ‘fundamentals’ should be and it overcomes 
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problems associated with measuring contagion through changes to correlation 
coefficients in the presence of unobservable shocks (see Rigobon, 2003b). The model 
can be summarized as follows. Let  and  represent equity market and currency 
returns respectively. Returns can be decomposed into an expected, 
tEr , tFXr ,
,iμ  and an 
unexpected component, , reflecting the arrival of news to financial markets, i.e.  itu
                           .0),( and ,,0)(, ,, ≠==+= tFXtEititiit uuEFXEiuEur μ    (1) 
The forecast errors are allowed to be contemporaneously correlated, implying that 
common structural shocks may potentially be driving both returns. We decompose the 
forecast errors of each asset return into an idiosyncratic and a common shock. Let 
 denote the common and idiosyncratic shocks respectively and 
let their impacts on asset returns be 
FXEizz itct ,, and =
FXEiitcit ,, and =σσ . Then the forecast errors 
are written as: 
.,, FXEizzu ititctcitit =+= σσ    (2) 
Furthermore, the shock variances are normalized to unity, which means the impact 
coefficients may be interpreted as their standard deviations. 
All unobservable shocks are heteroskedastic, which overcomes a shortcoming 
of some previous work, (e.g. Forbes and Rigobon, 2002), where it is implicitly 
assumed that any omitted common shocks have a constant variance. Following 
Gravelle, Kichian and Morley (2006) we allow both the common and the idiosyncratic 
shocks to switch between two states – high- and low-volatility. The heteroskedasticity 
of the structural shocks ensures the identification of the system (see also Rigobon, 
2003a). As shown by Gravelle, Kichian and Morley (2006), the regime switching 
behavior of the common shock is sufficient to identify the parameters associated with 
shift contagion, while the additional parameters introduced by the introduction of pure 
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contagion are identified through the regime-switching behavior of the idiosyncratic 
shocks. With this structure, each asset return can move between four distinct regimes. 
The structural impact coefficients FXEicitit ,,, =σσ  are given by the following: 
                             (3) 
FXEiSS
FXEiSS
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where    are state variables that take the value of zero in 
normal and unity in turbulent times. Variables with an asterisk belong to the high-
volatility regime. To complete the model, we need to specify the evolution of regimes 
over time. Following the regime-switching literature, the regime paths are Markov 
switching and are endogenously determined. Specifically, the conditional probabilities 
of remaining in the same state, i.e. not changing regime are defined as follows: 
cFXEiSit ,,),1,0( ==
cFXEipSS
cFXEiqSS
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====
    (4) 
Furthermore, we relax the assumption of expected constant returns in (1). 
These are allowed to be time varying and depend on the state of the common shock. 
In this respect, our model suggests that part of the asset return represents a risk 
premium that changes with the level of volatility.3 In particular, expected returns are 
modeled as follows: 
FXEiSS ctictiit , ,)1( =+−= ∗μμμ     (5) 
Given that idiosyncratic shocks are uncorrelated with common shocks and mainly 
associated with diversifiable risk, expected returns are not allowed to vary with the 
volatility state of these shocks. 
 To extend the framework beyond a test of shift contagion, we include channels 
                                                 
3 Gravelle, Kichian and Morley (2006) and Flavin and Panopoulou (2007, 2008) also relax this 
assumption when modeling the interdependence of bond and equity returns respectively.  
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through which the idiosyncratic shock of one market may potentially exert an 
influence on the other market during turbulent periods, over and above that captured 
by the common shock. This captures pure contagion. It is modeled by augmenting the 
return equation of market i with the idiosyncratic shock of market j (i ≠ j) during the 
crisis period (see DFGM, 2006 for a similar approach to capturing pure contagion).  
To illustrate the channels through which contagion may be transmitted, we 
present a simplified example. Though, the entire model is estimated in a single step, it 
implies different features of the model in each of the eight possible regimes. For 
example, if we take the extreme states, the characteristics of the model during tranquil 
periods (all shocks in the low-volatility states) are given as follows: 
FXtFXctcFXFXtFX
EtEctcEEtE
zzr
zzr
σσμ
σσμ
++=
++=
,
,    (6) 
The two idiosyncratic shocks are assumed to be independent, so co-movements in 
returns are solely determined by the common shock (factor). Thus, the variance- 
covariance matrix of returns is given by: 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+
+=Σ 22
22
1
cFXFXcFXcE
cFXcEcEE
σσσσ
σσσσ
.     
On the other hand, during crisis periods (all shocks in high-volatility states), 
the corresponding return generating process during periods of turbulence is given by 
EtEFXFXtFXctcFXFXtFX
FXtFXEEtEctcEEtE
zzzr
zzzr
****
,
****
,
σδσσμ
σδσσμ
+++=
+++=
   (7) 
The variance covariance matrix of returns is: 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
++++
++++=Σ 2*22*2*2*2***
2*2***2*22*2*
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EFXcFXFXFXEEFXcFXcE
FXEEFXcFXcEFXEcEE
σδσσσδσδσσ
σδσδσσσδσσ
. 
Comparing equations (6) and (7), the additional term in the return generating 
process of market i (δiσj*zj) detects and measures the importance of pure contagion 
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during episodes of high-volatility in the idiosyncratic shock of market j. 
An extra assumption of normality of the structural shocks enables us to 
estimate the model, given by equations (1)-(7), via maximum likelihood employing 
the methodology for Markov-switching models developed in Hamilton (1989).  
 
2.1 Testing for shift contagion. 
 Our rationale behind testing for shift contagion lies on the assumption, 
that in its absence, a large unexpected shock that affects both countries does not 
change their interdependence. In other words, the observed increase in the variance 
and correlation of returns during crisis periods is due to increased impulses stemming 
from the common shocks and not from changes in the propagation mechanism of 
shocks. Our test for shift contagion is based on a likelihood ratio test, where the null 
and alternative hypotheses are specified as follows: 
cFX
cE
cFX
cE
cFX
cE
cFX
cE HH σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ ≠= ∗
∗
∗
∗
:  versus: 10    (8)  
The null hypothesis postulates that in the absence of shift contagion, the impact 
coefficients in both calm and crisis periods should move proportionately. This 
likelihood ratio test is the common test for testing restrictions among nested models 
and follows a distribution with one degree of freedom corresponding to the 
restriction of equality of the ratio of coefficients between the two regimes. 
2χ
 
2.2. Testing for pure contagion. 
When the idiosyncratic shock of market i enters the high-volatility regime, it 
potentially exerts an influence in market j, thereby giving rise to pure contagion. This 
channel of transmission is only active during periods of high idiosyncratic volatility. 
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Our test for pure contagion from market j to market i is a simple t-test on the 
coefficient δi, where under the null δi =0 and there is no pure contagion. We also 
conduct a likelihood ratio test that both channels are jointly inactive to assess the 
importance of bi-directional effects. 
 
3. Data and Filters 
3.1. Data 
 Our analysis is conducted on the equity and foreign exchange markets of a 
group of East Asian emerging markets. In particular, we focus on Korea, Indonesia, 
the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. These countries are chosen as they 
have a sufficient time series of floating exchange rates to undertake the analysis. 4  As 
our test of shift contagion involves measuring the reaction of markets to a common 
shock, we require that the full reaction can be measured and not offset by government 
intervention. Therefore including ‘non-floating’ exchange rates would bias our results 
towards finding shift contagion. We work with weekly returns for both markets with 
currency returns computed as the log change in the US dollar exchange rate, where 
the exchange rate is expressed in terms of US dollars per 1 unit of local currency. 
Likewise, equity returns are computed as the log change in the value of the domestic 
stock market index. These indices are value-weighted and expressed in local currency. 
They were obtained from Datastream International; with the Datastream codes having 
the following structure: TOTMKXX, where XX represents the country code, i.e. KO 
(Korea), ID (Indonesia), PH (Philippines), SG (Singapore), TA (Taiwan) and TH 
                                                 
4 We had to preclude Malaysia and Hong Kong from the analysis, because Hong Kong adopted a 
currency board system and Malaysia pegged its currency to US dollar throughout most of the available 
sample. 
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(Thailand). We omit the data for the period prior to July 1997, because most of the 
East Asian countries adopted fixed or strict exchange rate regimes until the onset of 
the crisis. Therefore we have over ten years of data, yielding 556 data points for each 
series. Asset returns for the sample period, 4 July 1997-22 February 2008, are plotted 
in Figure 1. Clearly, both equity and foreign exchange returns have been highly 
volatile with a larger spread of returns being experienced in equity markets. 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 Table 1 presents some summary statistics. Panels A and B relate to equity and 
currency markets respectively, while panel C contains details of the dynamic 
correlations between markets in each country. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
  Mean equity returns are larger than foreign exchange returns for all markets. 
However, they are also more risky. Equity returns, with the exception of Taiwan, are 
positive over the sample, with Korea recording the highest mean return of 0.214%. 
However, it is noteworthy that in many instances, the median return is far from the 
mean, implying that the overall distribution of returns is non-normal. With the 
exception of Singapore, average currency returns are negative, indicating that the 
value of the domestic currency has fallen against the dollar over the sample period. 
Both asset returns exhibit significant skewness and kurtosis, with the Jarque Bera test 
decisively rejecting normality for all series. For most currencies, there is huge 
negative skewness present in the distribution of returns, indicating the presence of a 
number of extreme observations in the data.  
 
3.2. Data Filters 
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 Both Granger, Huang and Yang (2000) and Pan, Fok and Liu (2007) document 
significant autocorrelation and cross-correlation in equity and currency markets. Panel 
C of Table 1 confirms the presence of cross-correlation effects in our data also. As we 
wish to focus on the transmission of contemporaneous shocks, we pre-filter the data to 
remove any dynamic linkages. This is achieved by estimating a bi-variate VAR model 
on the equity and currency returns of each country. The order of the VAR is 
determined using a range of information criteria.5 A constant term is included so that 
all residual series have a zero mean. The residuals of the VAR are employed as our 
dependent variables in the application of the regime-switching methodology outlined 
above. Panel D of Table 1 shows that the correlations of the VAR residuals match 
those of the raw data very closely. In general, the correlation coefficients are quite 
low, suggesting the prevalence of important asset-specific effects. 
 
4. Results 
Firstly, we check the reliability of our estimates by performing a number of 
diagnostic tests and results are reported in Table 2.  
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Specifically, we test for the presence of serial correlation, ARCH effects and 
the Normality of the standardized residuals of the asset pairs examined. Columns 2 
and 3 report the LM test for serial correlation. For the majority of country asset pairs, 
we fail to reject the null of serial independence at both one and four lags. Likewise we 
find little evidence of ARCH effects (see columns 4 and 5). To test for Normality, we 
use the Cramer-von Mises test which is based on the overall approximation of the 
empirical distributions of standardized residuals to the Normal. Our results, reported 
                                                 
5 We do not include the VAR analysis here but all details are available from the authors upon request. 
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in Column 6, suggest that most of the asset residuals are normally distributed. Hence, 
we argue that our regime-switching model adequately captures the distribution of 
asset returns as the standardized residuals are well behaved. 
Furthermore, the regime qualification performance of our model is assessed by 
the Regime Classification Measure (RCM) statistic developed by Ang and Bekaert 
(2002). According to this measure, a good regime-switching model should classify 
regimes sharply, i.e. the smoothed (ex-post) regime probabilities, tp  are close to 
either one or zero. For a model with two regimes, the RCM is given by: 
)1(1*400
1
t
T
t
t ppT
RCM −= ∑
=
, 
where the constant serves to normalize the statistic to be between 0 and 100. The 
lower the RCM statistic, the better is the performance of the model. A perfect model 
will have a RCM close to zero; while in contrast, a model that poorly distinguishes 
between regimes will produce a statistic close to 100. Columns 7-9 of Table 2 report 
the RCMs for both idiosyncratic shocks and the common volatility shock respectively.  
In general, the regimes are well-defined. With the exception of Singapore and Taiwan, 
the common shock regimes are sharply distinguished with statistics less than 30. 
Likewise the regimes of the asset-specific shocks are sharply defined with the 
majority having RCM statistics less than 50. Shocks associated with the currency 
markets tend to be better captured than their counterparts in the equity markets.  
 
4.1. Estimates 
Initially, we focus on the expected component of returns, with estimates 
presented in Table 3.  Specifically, columns 2 and 3 report the expected mean returns 
during the low-volatility regime with the corresponding figures for turbulent periods 
reported in columns 4 and 5.  
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[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
This Table presents us with a number of striking features. Firstly, the low 
volatility regime is characterized by positive mean equity and foreign exchange 
returns in virtually all cases, with many being statistically significant at conventional 
levels. High volatility regimes are associated with lower equity returns in all cases. In 
fact, these are always negative, though admittedly many of these are not statistically 
different from zero. For currency returns, this pattern, while present in some 
countries, is not as clear. Secondly, we test for the equality of expected asset mean 
returns between regimes. We perform a likelihood ratio test but results vary across 
countries. The hypothesis of equal means is rejected for Singapore, the Philippines 
and Thailand but not for the remaining countries. Consequently, we conduct the 
analysis with and without the restriction of equal expected returns across regimes. The 
results do not differ qualitatively, so we report results in the subsequent analysis 
where expected returns are allowed to be regime dependent.6
   
4.2. Tests for shift contagion 
 We begin with an analysis of ‘shift’ contagion. In particular, we focus on the 
stability of the transmission of common shocks between low- and high-volatility 
regimes. Given that asset pairs belong to the same country, this shock can be thought 
of as being a ‘country’ shock – at least in the sense that it picks up unanticipated 
domestic occurrences as well as a common exposure to global events. First, we focus 
on the prevalence of the high-volatility regime for this ‘country’ shock and Figure 2 
presents the filtered probabilities of this state being realized. 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                 
6 Guidolin and Timmermann (2005) for UK assets and Flavin and Panopoulou (2007) for G-7 equity 
markets reject the hypothesis of equal means across regimes. 
 13
 For Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand, there are pronounced and 
persistent periods of high-volatility in the common shock. These are predominantly in 
the early part of our sample which coincides with the Asian crisis of 1997-98 and the 
subsequent turmoil on global markets associated with further crises in Russian bond 
markets, the near-collapse of the LTCM hedge fund, the Brazilian and Argentinean 
bond market shocks and the ‘Dot com’ crisis of the early 2000s. For all of these 
countries, the common shock undergoes a period of low volatility from approximately 
2002 onwards, with some evidence of higher volatility returning towards the sample 
end – probably a reaction to the global credit crisis whose affects have sent ripples 
throughout global financial markets. On the other hand, the common shocks 
experienced in Singapore and Taiwan exhibit little persistence in the high-volatility 
regime. This may be due to the fact that their foreign exchange rates were not fixed 
against the dollar prior to the Asian crisis and hence did not experience such a large 
drop as their currencies were unlikely to be as over-valued as those of neighboring 
countries. Consequently, the country shock may not have resulted in such a huge 
change in their dollar exchange rates as those suffered by Indonesia and Korea. 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 4 presents a more detailed description of the behavior of the country 
shock. The statistics ‘Frequency’ and ‘Duration’ report the prevalence and persistence 
of the high-volatility regime. Frequency measures the proportion of time that the 
common shock is in this state, while duration is the length of time (in years) for which 
a high-volatility common shock persists.7 They provide numerical evidence similar to 
that contained in Figure 2. For all countries, the common shock is in the high-
volatility regime at least 20% of the time, reaching a high of 55% for Korea. The 
                                                 
7 ‘Frequency’ is computed as (1-Q) / (2-Q-P) while ‘Duration’ is computed as 1 / (1-P), where P and Q 
are defined as in equation (4). 
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Korean shock also displays high persistence with duration of nearly six years. Korea 
appears to be the most affected by the regional and subsequent financial market crises 
that characterized global markets from 1997 onwards. At the other extreme, the 
Taiwanese country shock spends the least proportion of time in the turbulent state and 
persists for only a few weeks. Averaging across countries, common shocks are in the 
high-volatility regime about 34% of the time, with persistence of 1.5 years. This gives 
us sufficient observations in each regime to overcome problems of low power due to 
small crisis samples inherent in many other tests of contagion (see DFGM, 2007). 
The remaining columns of Table 4 present estimates of the impact coefficients 
of common structural shocks for calm (σ) and turbulent (σ*) times as well as the ratio, 
γ, upon which our test of shift contagion is based. The impact coefficients reveal a 
number of interesting facts. Firstly, in both regimes, the equity response to a common 
shock is greater than that for currency returns. This reflects the relatively high risk 
associated with this asset class. Secondly, for both assets, the response to the high-
volatility shock is larger than its low-volatility counterpart. As expected, both assets 
display greater sensitivity to larger shocks. Finally, in both regimes the dispersion of 
estimates is greater for equity returns and is larger in the high-volatility state.  
To perform a statistical test for shift contagion, we first construct the following 
statistic:  
.,max *
*
*
*
⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧=
cFXcE
cEcFX
cEcFX
cFXcE
σσ
σσ
σσ
σσγ  
This is simply the ratio of the estimated impact coefficients coefficients in the high 
volatility regime to the ratio of those in the low volatility regime and allows us to test 
if these are proportional across regimes. If the transmission mechanism governing the 
country shock is stable, then we should observe a ratio of unity. Conversely, if this 
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transmission is altered, i.e. shift contagion, our ratio should be statistically different 
from one. The computed ratio is large in all cases, suggesting a potential change in the 
transmission mechanism. To test whether or not it is statistically different from unity, 
we perform a likelihood ratio test and the results are presented in Table 5. 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Despite the magnitude of the ratio, we only find statistically significant 
evidence of shift contagion for Korea and the Philippines. For Korea, the change in 
the transmission of the country shock is entirely due to the increased sensitivity of the 
equity return as the response of the currency return is unchanged between regimes. 
For the majority of markets, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no shift contagion. 
For Indonesia, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand, there is no evidence that the 
transmission of the country shock is different between regimes and thus linkages due 
to the common shock remain stable over different market conditions. The degree of 
interdependence between equity and currency markets that exists in normal market 
conditions is likely to also prevail in turbulent states for these four countries.  
 
4.3. Tests for pure contagion 
 We next turn our attention to tests of pure contagion. Pure contagion refers to 
the phenomenon whereby the asset-specific shock of one market spills over to the 
other through channels that only operate during periods of market turbulence. Without 
a theory to guide us as to the direction of these contagious effects, our model 
simultaneously evaluates the importance of bi-directional contagion. We begin by 
analyzing the behavior of these shocks, with the filtered probabilities of being in the 
high-volatility states presented in Figures 3 and 4 for equities and foreign exchange 
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markets respectively. Given that we have controlled for the common factors, these 
shocks can be thought of as being a pure equity and pure currency shock respectively. 
[FIGURES 3 & 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 For equity markets, and in contrast to the common shock, we find that the 
idiosyncratic shock for Singapore and Taiwan is quite often in the high-volatility state 
and is quite persistent. For the other countries, the equity shock is less persistent but 
nevertheless, spends a large proportion of the time in the turbulent regime. With the 
exception of Taiwan, the foreign exchange shock is far less frequently in the high-
volatility state. Once the Asian crisis of 1997-98 had ended, the currency markets of 
most countries settled back into a sustained period of tranquility. 
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 Table 6 provides a more in-depth analysis of results pertaining to these asset-
specific shocks. Consistent with the graphical evidence, the ‘Frequency’ statistic 
shows us that the proportion of time spent in the high-volatility regime is greater for 
the equity shock than the currency shock. For equity markets, the range of time spent 
in this regime is 23% for Thailand up to 71.4% for Singapore. In contrast the 
corresponding range for currency markets is 5% (Korea) to 33% (Taiwan). Likewise 
the persistence of shocks varies widely across markets and countries. Persistent equity 
shocks are observed for Singapore and Taiwan, while in Korea and Thailand, these 
shocks are quickly dissipated.  All foreign exchange shocks are relatively short-lived, 
with a duration measure of less than one year for all countries except Singapore. In 
summary, equity shocks occur more frequently and show greater persistence than 
foreign exchange shocks but both are sufficiently widespread to be of concern to 
investors and policymakers if they spill over into other markets. 
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 As in the case of the common shock, we find large variation in the impact 
coefficients of the idiosyncratic shocks and much increased sensitivity when moving 
from the low- to the high-volatility state. However, the key parameters are δE and δFX, 
which capture the strength of pure contagion effects transmitted to the equity and 
foreign exchange markets respectively. The results confirm the importance of 
simultaneously modeling bi-directional pure contagion. In all but one case, we find 
strong evidence of such effects. The transmission of the idiosyncratic shock is 
unstable between regimes. In turbulent periods these shocks spill over to the other 
market, thus becoming an additional common factor. For all countries, but Thailand, 
currency shocks influence the equity market. This is consistent with foreign investors 
fleeing domestic equity markets as they become worried about the depreciation of the 
domestic currency. For example, the Bank of International Settlements report a sharp 
reversal in capital flows between 1996 and 1997 for Indonesia, Thailand, Korea, 
Malaysia and the Philippines. Net capital inflows of US$95 billion turned to a net 
capital outflow of US$12 billion.  The reverse contagion channel, i.e. equity to foreign 
exchange markets, is also operational during periods of turbulent equity markets and, 
with the exception of Taiwan, we find evidence of statistically significant pure 
contagion. This channel is particularly strong for Indonesia. For Singapore, we find a 
negative coefficient for δFX, which may imply a flight-to-quality effect. When equity 
shocks enter their high-volatility state, investors seek refuge in currency assets. This 
suggests that investors view the Singaporean dollar as a safer currency than its 
regional counterparts. It may also reflect the belief that Singapore has become a 
‘developed’ rather than an ‘emerging’ market. 
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
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 Finally, Table 7 reports results of a likelihood ratio test for the joint 
significance of the pure contagion parameters. In all cases, we decisively reject the 
null hypothesis that these parameters are jointly zero. It confirms the importance of 
accounting for potential bi-directional pure contagion. Much of the extant literature is 
incapable of simultaneously picking up these market interactions.  
 
4.4. Conditional correlations 
 To ascertain the contribution of pure contagion to overall asset market co-
movement, we look at its influence on the time-varying correlations generated by our 
model. Firstly, we compute the conditional correlation of equity and currency markets 
in each country and these are depicted in Figure 5. 
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 There is considerable time variation in the co-movement, which is consistent 
with much of the extant literature. Using a sample of over 108 years, Bordo and 
Murshid (2000) show that stock market correlations have exhibited large variation, 
both in tranquil and crisis periods. Figure 5 shows no clear pattern across countries 
and only in Singapore, do we find higher than usual correlation during the Asian 
crisis. It also depicts the difficulty of trying to detect contagion on the basis of looking 
for changes in correlation around the time of a significant event.  
[FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 Figure 6 presents the time-varying contribution of pure contagion to the 
conditional correlations presented above. We decompose the correlation into a 
component due to the common shock and another due to pure contagion. We then 
report the proportion of the total conditional correlation arising from the presence of 
pure contagion. The graphical evidence suggests that its contribution is considerable 
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for all markets. For all countries, there is a definite relationship between the 
conditional correlation and the proportion due to idiosyncratic spillovers. All markets 
show that up to 30% of co-movement may be attributable to pure contagious effects. 
The importance of this channel is clear during the Asian crisis for most countries and 
re-emerges during the recent period of global financial turmoil. 
 
4.5. Conditional Variances 
 Finally, we examine the conditional asset variances and investigate the impact 
of pure contagion on them. For ease of exposition we do this on a state-by-state basis. 
There are eight possible states of the world, ranging from state 1, where all shocks are 
in the low-volatility regime, to state 8, where the high-volatility regime prevails for 
all. Table 8 summarizes the behavior of shocks within each state.  
[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 Figure 7 presents the conditional variances for each asset type by country. The 
conditional variance of the equity return is generally greater than that of the FX 
return, though Korean and Indonesian currency returns are exceptions in the states 
with high-volatility FX shocks. It is noteworthy that currency returns in Singapore and 
Taiwan are generally low across states, which is consistent with results reported 
earlier. On the other hand, Indonesian asset markets exhibit high conditional variances 
compared to its regional neighbors. This is a consequence of the intense economic and 
political unrest that has crippled the country in the aftermath of the Asian crisis. 
[FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 However, to appraise the importance of pure contagion, we decompose the 
conditional variances into their constituent channels. Figures 8 and 9 present these 
decompositions for equity and currencies respectively.  
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 [FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 Pure contagious effects from the FX to equity markets operate in states 3, 4, 7 
and 8. From Figure 8, we see modest contributions from this channel to overall asset 
risk across all countries. It is most important in Korea and Singapore, especially in 
state 3 when the FX shock is the only one experiencing high volatility. However, the 
pure contagion channel is dominated by the influence of the common shock. This 
contributes the majority of equity risk for most countries. The main exceptions are 
Taiwan and Singapore who both avoided the worst effects of the Asian crisis (see 
Flavin and Panopoulou, 2008). The pure equity shock operates in all states but apart 
from Singapore, it plays a smaller role than the common shock. 
[FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
 On the other hand, a clearer picture emerges with respect to the conditional 
variances of FX returns. The most striking feature of Figure 9 is, in contrast to equity 
markets, the small role played by the common shock in determining currency risk. 
With the exception of Taiwan (where FX variances are very small anyway), the 
common shock is unimportant and is dominated by the FX idiosyncratic shock and the 
pure contagion channel.  The majority of risk can be attributed to the asset-specific 
shock but there is evidence of pure contagion in states 2, 4, 6 and 8 when the equity 
shock is in the turbulent regime. This channel is most important in Korea, Indonesia, 
the Philippines and Thailand. All these countries suffered huge currency devaluations 
during the Asian crisis as they were all forced to abandon their fixed rates with the US 
dollar. Therefore pure contagion is an important source of risk for both asset classes 
but has a relatively larger effect on the most recently floated exchange rates. 
 
5. Conclusions 
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 We develop a model that allows us to simultaneously test for the presence of 
both shift and bi-directional pure contagion. This model is well suited to analyzing the 
stability of linkages between domestic equity and foreign exchange markets. In 
particular, we focus on the stability of the transmission mechanism of common shocks 
across different volatility regimes, i.e. shift contagion, and concurrently we 
investigate if asset-specific shocks spill over to other assets during periods of high 
volatility, i.e. pure contagion.  
 Our analysis concentrates on the emerging financial markets of East Asia over 
a sample period when their exchange rates were floating against the US dollar. We 
find widespread evidence of pure contagious effects. Shocks that originate in either 
equity or currency markets influence the other market during turbulent market 
conditions. In essence, the once asset-specific shock becomes an additional common 
factor during episodes of high-volatility. Our results convey the importance of 
allowing for bi-directional pure contagion, as in practice the source of the adverse 
shock can be difficult to identify. In contrast, there is relatively little statistical 
evidence of shift contagion. For the majority of countries, both asset returns respond 
in a stable manner regardless of the volatility state of the common shock.  
 We also investigate the economic significance of the pure contagious effects. 
Pure contagion can account for up to 30% of the asset co-movement observed. While 
it varies substantially, its contribution to the conditional correlation generated by our 
model is always positive. Likewise, we decompose conditional variances by state into 
components due to the common factor, own idiosyncratic factors and pure contagion. 
The common shock is the dominant factor in determining equity market volatility but 
its influence on currency risk is negligible. The latter market is most influenced by its 
 22
own asset-specific shocks. Pure contagious effects are important for both asset types 
but particularly for the FX markets of the most recently floated currencies. 
 In summary, the linkages between equity and currency markets in emerging 
economies do not appear to be stable. There is little statistical evidence that common 
shocks cause this instability but rather it appears to emanate from transmission 
channels that emerge when the asset-specific shock of either market experiences 
episodes of high volatility. This finding is likely to concern both policymakers and 
investors alike. Policymakers need to take note that high-volatility asset-specific 
shocks may not be contained for long and therefore a speedy response is necessary to 
prevent the spread of turbulence throughout the financial system of the affected 
country. Non-domestic equity investors will be worried that pure contagious effects 
will further compound their equity losses as the foreign exchange component of 
overall return falls simultaneously, while domestic equity investors may find it more 
difficult to diversify away from home assets in bear markets due to a loss of 
purchasing power of the proceeds of portfolio liquidation.  
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Table 1.   
Panel A. Summary Descriptive Statistics-Equity Returns 
 Korea Indonesia Philippines Singapore Taiwan Thailand 
Mean 0.214 0.186 0.023 0.109 -0.021 0.086 
Median 0.528 0.302 0.108 0.255 0.162 0.064 
Maximum 16.95 22.72 14.74 11.74 19.59 25.27 
Minimum -19.57 -20.43 -21.13 -18.28 -14.53 -17.58 
Std. Dev. 4.878 4.743 3.417 2.921 3.754 4.598 
Skewness -0.216 0.065 -0.411 -0.508 0.074 0.330 
Kurtosis 4.787 6.631 7.801 6.826 5.436 6.068 
Jarque Bera 78.3 (0.000) 
305.8 
(0.000) 
549.8 
(0.000) 
363.1 
(0.000) 
138.0 
(0.000) 
228.1 
(0.000) 
 
Panel B. Summary Descriptive Statistics-Foreign Exchange Returns 
 Korea Indonesia Philippines Singapore Taiwan Thailand 
Mean -0.012 -0.239 -0.078 0.003 -0.021 -0.040 
Median 0.064 -0.017 -0.012 0.016 0.000 0.043 
Maximum 13.60 38.62 7.67 7.93 3.55 9.68 
Minimum -33.05 -56.86 -12.78 -4.45 -4.37 -11.88 
Std. Dev. 2.215 4.758 1.431 0.858 0.676 1.706 
Skewness -5.848 -3.401 -1.683 1.081 -0.749 -1.001 
Kurtosis 97.409 56.654 21.048 18.892 12.798 16.939 
Jarque Bera 209656.7 (0.000) 
67764.0 
(0.000) 
7808.6 
(0.000) 
5959.1 
(0.000) 
2275.8 
(0.000) 
4594.0 
(0.000) 
 
Panel C. Dynamic Correlations between Equity and Foreign Exchange Returns 
 Korea Indonesia Philippines Singapore Taiwan Thailand 
eq(t),fx(t) 0.374 0.200 0.375 0.321 0.298 0.254 
eq(t),fx(t-1) -0.160 -0.088 0.023 0.037 0.019 -0.059 
eq(t),fx(t-2) -0.005 -0.157 0.049 0.059 0.000 0.008 
eq(t),fx(t-3) 0.033 0.075 0.009 0.058 0.021 -0.019 
eq(t),fx(t-4) -0.074 -0.067 0.058 0.021 0.005 -0.004 
eq(t-1),fx(t) -0.065 -0.059 0.038 -0.110 0.050 0.051 
eq(t-2),fx(t) 0.098 0.204 0.145 0.119 0.043 0.212 
eq(t-3),fx(t) 0.022 0.005 0.089 -0.025 0.068 0.011 
eq(t-4),fx(t) 0.063 -0.018 0.041 -0.035 0.061 0.054 
Panel D. Correlations between Equity and Foreign Exchange Returns 
 Korea Indonesia Philippines Singapore Taiwan Thailand 
Original data 0.374 0.200 0.375 0.321 0.298 0.254 
VAR residuals 0.375 0.258 0.371 0.332 0.299 0.269 
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Table 2. Diagnostic tests on standardized residuals and model specification 
 
Country   LM(1) LM(4)  ARCH(1) ARCH(4) Normality RCME RCMFX  RCMC
Korea 1.89 2.127 8.682* 27.03* 0.105 65.04 3.04 14.56 
 0.194 10.86 26.10* 80.70* 0.089    
Indonesia 0.049 1.043 1.293 1.579 0.178 51.97 12.55 26.16 
 1.252 4.571 0.002 2.929 0.095    
Philippines 0.637 0.974 0.564 3.142 0.059 65.07 8.41 20.43 
 10.43* 21.39* 0.897 3.358 0.121    
Singapore 0.034 0.743 8.727* 19.65* 0.152 11.41 4.83 77.13 
 6.035 6.516 4.77 5.422 0.023    
Taiwan 0.008 1.744 0.656 5.771 0.047 16.85 35.81 43.20 
 0.288 3.515 8.712* 52.56* 0.288*    
Thailand 1.784 1.962 1.265 3.823 0.053 50.10 6.01 26.17 
 1.894 5.606 0.016 5.793 0.234*       
Notes: LM(k) is the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier test for no serial correlation up to lag k, 
ARCH(k) is the Lagrange Multiplier test for no ARCH effects of order k, Normality is the Cramer-von-
Mises test for the null of Normality,  RCMi is the Regime Classification Measure, where i=E, FX, C 
for the equity and currency idiosyncratic shock and the common shock, respectively. * denotes 
significance at 1% level. LM(k) and ARCH(k) have a distribution under the null hypothesis. 
The Cramer-von-Mises test has a non-standard distribution and the cut-off value for RCM is 50. 
)(2 kχ
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Table 3. Estimates of mean returns across regimes 
 
Country μE μFX μ *E μ*FX LR p-val 
Korea 0.349 0.105 -0.150 0.019 2.25 0.32 
 (0.184) (0.056) (0.339) (0.074)   
Indonesia 0.215 0.071 -0.470 -0.191 1.93 0.38 
 (0.195) (0.009) (0.458) (0.278)   
Philippines 0.051 0.025 -0.056 0.360 6.01** 0.05 
 (0.137) (0.027) (0.212) (0.110)   
Singapore 0.467 0.026 -0.380 0.016 10.10*** 0.01 
 (0.108) (0.034) (0.235) (0.056)   
Taiwan 0.543 -0.044 -1.387 0.287 0.73 0.69 
 (0.139) (0.018) (0.526) (0.048)   
Thailand 0.162 0.095 -0.189 -0.078 4.59* 0.10 
 (0.222) (0.042) (0.372) (0.073)     
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients. Likelihood ratio statistic is for the null of 
equality of mean returns across the regimes. The test statistic has a distribution under the null 
hypothesis. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level, and * denotes 
significance at 10% level. 
)2(2χ
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Table 4. Estimates of impact coefficients of common shocks 
 
Country σcE σcFX σ*cE σ*cFX γ Frequency Duration 
Korea 2.384 0.061 4.729 0.062 1.98 54.9% 5.69 
 (0.132) (0.080) (0.249) (0.080)    
Indonesia 3.153 0.272 6.176 0.294 1.81 24.9% 1.37 
 (0.129) (0.060) (2.054) (0.192)    
Philippines 2.290 0.073 5.353 0.533 3.14 20.1% 0.52 
 (0.094) (0.028) (0.457) (0.139)    
Singapore 0.004 0.001 1.873 0.497 3.11 45.5% 0.09 
 (0.097) (0.013) (0.249) (0.072)    
Taiwan 1.206 0.208 3.333 0.311 1.85 20.7% 0.03 
 (0.297) (0.048) (0.429) (0.042)    
Thailand 2.662 0.145 5.689 0.212 1.46 36.2% 1.31 
 (0.138) (0.059) (0.308) (0.082)     
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients. “Duration” refers to the duration of the high 
volatility common shock expressed in years. “Frequency.” refers to the unconditional probability of 
the high volatility regime expressed in percentage. 
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 Table 5. Likelihood ratio tests for shift contagion 
 
Country  LR p-val 
Korea 34.81*** 0.00 
   
Indonesia 0.46 0.50 
   
Philippines 4.21** 0.04 
   
Singapore 0.01 0.99 
   
Taiwan 0.40 0.53 
   
Thailand 0.62 0.43 
   
Notes: Likelihood ratio statistic is for the null of no shift contagion against the alternative of shift 
contagion between the equity and FX returns of the indicated countries.. The test statistic has a 
distribution under the null hypothesis. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance 
at 5% level, and * denotes significance at 10% level.  
)1(χ 2
 30
Table 6. Estimates of impact coefficients of idiosyncratic shocks  
Bi-directional pure contagion 
 
Country  σ E σFX σ*E σ*FX δE δFX
Frequency / 
Duration (E) 
Frequency / 
Duration (FX)
Korea 0.001 0.826 3.752 7.583 0.502 0.301 42.3% 4.7% 
 (0.021) (0.071) (0.659) (1.085) (0.138) (0.052) 0.19 0.21 
Indonesia 0.043 0.912 1.073 9.764 0.185 1.923 52.8% 16.2% 
 (1.720) (0.041) (0.423) (0.827) (0.060) (0.722) 0.50 0.28 
Philippines 1.023 0.374 1.024 3.244 0.349 0.833 50.1% 9.6% 
 (0.043) (0.028) (0.046) (0.321) (0.160) (0.069) 0.19 0.38 
Singapore 0.836 0.482 2.746 1.739 1.415 -0.038 71.4% 11.2% 
 (0.113) (0.026) (0.153) (0.158) (0.232) (0.018) 6.95 1.36 
Taiwan 1.589 0.110 4.003 1.053 1.147 0.001 50.9% 32.9% 
 (0.242) (0.079) (0.251) (0.075) (0.246) (0.006) 5.45 0.13 
Thailand 0.010 0.589 2.317 3.663 0.215 0.492 23.1% 8.9% 
 (0.284) (0.058) (0.881) (0.314) (0.167) (0.138) 0.13 0.65 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients. “Duration” refers to the duration of the high 
volatility regime of the idiosyncratic shock expressed in years. “Frequency” refers to the unconditional 
probability of the high volatility regime expressed in percentage. 
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Table 7. Likelihood ratio tests for pure contagion 
 
Country  LR p-val 
Korea 46.87*** 0.00 
   
Indonesia 25.50*** 0.00 
   
Philippines 49.43*** 0.00 
   
Singapore 28.80*** 0.00 
   
Taiwan 19.47*** 0.00 
   
Thailand 10.62*** 0.00 
     
Notes: Likelihood ratio statistic is for the null of no pure contagion against the alternative of bi-directional 
pure contagion between the equity and FX returns of the indicated countries. The test statistic has a χ2(2) 
distribution under the null hypothesis. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% 
level, and * denotes significance at 10% level. 
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Table 8. Summary of shock within each state 
 
 Equity Shock 
FX  
Shock 
Common 
Shock 
State 1 Low Low Low 
    
State 2 High Low Low 
    
State 3 Low High Low 
    
State 4 High High Low 
    
State 5 Low Low High 
    
State 6 High Low High 
    
State 7 Low High High 
    
State 8 High  High High  
Notes: Low (High) indicates that within that state the shock is in the low- (high-) volatility regime. 
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Figure 1. Data 
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Figure 2. Filter Probabilities of high volatility common shocks 
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Figure 3. Filter Probabilities of idiosyncratic shock for the equity market 
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Figure 4. Filter Probabilities of idiosyncratic shock for the FX market 
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Figure 5. Conditional correlations  
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Figure 6. Contribution of pure contagion to conditional correlations  
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Figure 7. Conditional Variances by state 
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Figure 8. Decomposition of equity variances by state 
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Figure 9. Decomposition of FX variances by state 
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